

# INDIA'S PARTITION

The story of imperialism in retreat

*D.N. Panigrahi*

 **Routledge**  
Taylor & Francis Group  
LONDON AND NEW YORK

**Also available as a printed book**  
see title verso for ISBN details

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

# INDIA'S PARTITION

The story of imperialism in retreat

*D.N. Panigrahi*

 Routledge  
Taylor & Francis Group  
LONDON AND NEW YORK

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.



## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.


Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



*Map 1* India Before Partition, is reproduced from *The Transfer of Power* volume 12. It is dated 1940.



Map 2 The Indian Union and Pakistan, 15 August 1947, is reproduced from *An Historical Atlas of The Indian Peninsula* by G.C. Davies published by OUP, Madras, 1949 fifth impression 1957.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



*Illustration 1* Winston Churchill (19505) (No. 1991).



*Illustration 2* Clement-Attlee (1953) only Attlee photo to be taken for publication (No. 1469).



*Illustration 3* Indian Cabinet taking oath at office – 15 August 1947 (oft repeated photo No. 24987).



*Illustration 4* Lord & Lady Mountbatten with Gandhi, 1947 (No. 21672).



*Illustration 5* The Viceroy Lord Mountbatten discussing partition plan with leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, 2 June 1947 (No. 24983). Clockwise seated are Lord Mountbatten, M.A. Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Abdul Rab Nishtar, Baldev Singh, J.B. Kripalani, Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru. Also sitting behind are Mieville and Lord Ismay.



*Illustration 6* Jinnah with Cabinet mission members – Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Lord Alexander and Sir Stafford Cripps. Jinnah is seen shaking hands with the Viceroy Lord Wavell, 1946 (No. 24937).






*Illustration 7* Gandhi with Lord Pethick-Lawrence, 1946 (No. 27884).



*Illustration 8* Jinnah with members of British Parliamentary Delegation (Jan–Feb 1946) (No. 27954).



*Illustration 9* Jinnah playing billiards, 1945 (No. 25705).



*Illustration 10* Gandhi with Stafford Cripps, 1942 (No. 80834).



*Illustration 11* Sir Stafford Cripps, 1942 (No. 24941).

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.



## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

If in 1920 an Indian, even a member of the Indian National Congress, had been stopped and asked whether his country would not only be freed of British rule, but partitioned along communal lines within thirty years, one wonders what the reply would have been?

Counter-factual history should, of course, always carry plenty of health warnings. However, it can also be used to guard against that other besetting temptation of the discipline, that of hindsight. That certain eventualities take place in the end does not prove their inevitability. And in explaining them the historian must also explain why various plausible alternatives do not win out.

Certainly, in 1920 the partition of India is unlikely to have been regarded as an inevitability. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man who was to become the principal advocate of the Pakistan idea, was still a member of the Indian National Congress. His protestations of the distinct identity of Muslims, requiring satisfaction in the creation of a separate state, lay in the future. And even when he began to make them, they did not necessarily fall on fertile ground.

Partition, in other words, was not foredoomed. There is always a risk, however, that in starting off with the question, 'why did partition occur?', and even more with the question, 'how did it occur?', the historian can make it appear so. One of the many strengths of this book is that Professor Panigrahi seeks to explore how limited were the grounds for partition in inter-war India. As he shows, Jinnah by the 1930s may have come to conceive of a separate identity for Muslims, but this view was not then shared by most of his co-religionists.

Partition, after all, is a political device introduced to resolve problems which, at least in part, flow from identity politics. In 1920, identity politics were not such that as to prompt this resolution. There is always a risk, nevertheless, that the introduction of new forms of political communication and articulation will, however, bring with them new ways of expressing and exacerbating identity politics. These new forms emerged with the regional governments elected in the wake of the 1935 Government of India Act.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.

## INDIA'S PARTITION

Why did the partition of India take place? Was it the inevitable result of a continent divided by religion and facing a power vacuum at the end of the Raj, or was it a chance occurrence arising from unique set of historical circumstances? And what were the roles played by men such as Churchill, Attlee, Jinnah, Gandhi and Nehru?

In this erudite account of the momentous events surrounding Indian independence, D.N. Panigrahi argues that the split was not a foregone conclusion. The British had always entertained a grand vision of Indian unity, not merely in a geographical and political sense, but also a cultural one.

In fact, nobody seemed particularly keen on partition, yet it happened anyway. A convergence of complex socio-economic reality and political compulsions in the wake of an intense and troubled colonial encounter provided a setting for the climactic event of partition and independence at the tail end of the Raj.

Based on new material collected in England and India, Panigrahi demystifies the roles of the towering political figures of the day and seeks to explain why India headed towards division – a political outcome that continues to affect the world today.

Of interest to scholars of the British empire and the subcontinent, this illuminating text poses key questions for students of history and current affairs.

**D.N. Panigrahi** is a leading historian of Indo-British connection and was Senior Lecturer/Reader at the University of Delhi before joining the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library as Deputy Director. His numerous publications include *Quit India and the Struggle for Freedom* (1984). He is now retired.